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Introduction 
In 1991 Professor Thomas Homer-Dixon of the University of Toronto published "On the Threshold: 
Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict" in the journal International Security. In that 
paper he argued that as environmental degradation increased societal disruption would increase 
along with it, while the capacity for coping with that disruption shrank. Accordingly, early 
intervention to halt that degradation had become a security issue. 
Journalist Robert Kaplan compared this article favorably with George Kennan's Long Telegram, 
going so far as to say that just as America's Cold War policy of containing the Soviet Union had 
its beginnings in Kennan's writing, "our post-Cold War foreign policy will one day be seen to have 
had its beginnings" in "On The Threshold."[1] 
While Kaplan helped popularize Homer-Dixon's ideas, they never received the same attention as 
Francis Fukuyama's or Thomas Friedman's, for instance. Additionally, while environmental 
security issues are now a regular feature of the dialogue among academics, the concept has 
enjoyed little recognition at the level of policy. Regrettably one can search in vain for anything 
more than cursory mention of the environment in current policy planning documents. 
Since then Homer-Dixon has broadened the scope of his research. His 2000 book The Ingenuity 
Gap: Facing the Economic, Environmental, and Other Challenges of an Increasingly Complex 
and Unpredictable Future presents a look at those challenges through the lens of complexity 
theory, on which it is a handy primer.[2] In particular the author stressed the rising complexity of 
human-made social and technological systems, and the inherently difficult problems those 
systems raised. The Ingenuity Gap also questioned the conventional wisdom that science, 
democracy and markets would always deliver the ingenuity needed to solve those problems. 
Homer-Dixon has since followed this up with The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity And 
The Renewal Of Civilization. Where in the previous book he presented an introductory look at the 
problem, here he offers a "big picture" view of modernity under threat from multiple directions, 
ranging from global warming to nuclear terrorism. In doing so the author draws heavily on many 
disciplines, and in particular the work of two renowned complexity theorists, Joseph Tainter and 
C.S. Holling.[3] 
In synthesizing their work The Upside of Down presents a model that can be crudely described as 
follows. Systems, such as social systems, routinely respond to problems by becoming more 
connected, specialized, regulated and efficient—in other words, with a more complex 
organization of their resources. For instance, an agrarian society facing declining rainfall may 
respond by building an irrigation system to keep its crops watered. 
However, complexity is a movement away from thermodynamic equilibrium. It requires inputs of 
energy to sustain it (or in thermodynamic terms, keep entropy at bay). More complexity means 
more energy is needed for maintenance, just as the irrigation system requires constant 
maintenance to keep it functional. This is not a problem in itself, but investments in complexity 
can pass a point of diminishing marginal returns, as could happen when that irrigation system is 
expanded to less fertile farmland, so that the same investment of labor produces smaller 
increases in food production. 
These diminishing returns (which might eventually become negative returns) eat into a system's 
"slack," the unused buffering capacity that lets it absorb unexpected shocks, such as surplus food 
production which would help the society respond to a barbarian attack or a natural disaster. As a 
result a shock like this is increasingly likely to induce a system-wide collapse. Awful as this 
outcome may be, though, collapse is not necessarily the end of that system. The reduction of its 
connectivity, specialization and regulation by that collapse also mean that the resources that were 
so rigidly organized before (such as the labor and wealth once absorbed by the now-defunct 
irrigation system) are released for reorganization. 
Homer-Dixon terms this cyclical renewal through breakdown "catagenesis," and in his analysis 
our civilization is in a late phase of this cycle. It is increasingly efficient, connected and complex, 
but also increasingly brittle, and in jeopardy of running out of the energy needed to sustain itself. 
To make the case that modern societies are at this point the author uses the concept of EROI 
(Energy Return On Investment), and the diminishing returns to oil production as supplies become 
scarcer and more expensive to recover.[4] 
This is precisely the moment at which an unexpected shock is most likely to cause a system-wide 
breakdown, and the book identifies five major stresses of particular concern: population stress, 
due to high growth rates in poor societies and the expansion of their megacities; energy stress, 
especially a scarcity of conventional oil; environmental stress, from damage to land, water, 
forests and fisheries; climate stress; and economic stress due to financial instability and widening 
inequality. 
Each of these problems rates a full chapter in this book. The connections between problems are 
also given their due, such as the implications of climate change for resource use, and the ways 
population pressure and widening inequality can produce negative synergies. The book also 
demonstrates the connections between these issues and more commonly discussed problems 
like terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and state failure, providing a useful reminder of how 
ecological, economic and resource concerns usually underlie those issues. 
On the whole the book's mastery of this very diverse material is formidable, and the presentation 
highly readable. Additionally, while some reviewers have faulted it for being short on solutions, 
the book in fact does rather well on that point. All too often the solutions offered at the end of 
even a very solid analysis turn out to be underdeveloped or simplistic, frequently because they 
dare not offend the pieties of the moment. 
This can not be said of The Upside of Down. Homer-Dixon does not downplay his position that a 
passive or managerial approach to these problems is wholly inadequate. Additionally, while 
technology will be key he notes that "at root, our global problems are not really technical ones: 
they're political problems fraught with conflicts over values, interests, and power; surrounded by 
scientific uncertainty; and burdened with deep moral implications." 
Nor does the author say that dealing with those political problems will be easy and painless. He 
argues that within the framework of a fossil-fuel based, laissez-faire global economy committed to 
a "growth imperative" of limitless expansion, the prospects for a fundamental solution are slim. 
Modern civilization may have to change significantly to survive, starting with its basic economic 
assumptions, like the desirability of continuous economic growth; the decoupling of economies 
from nature; the ability of markets to solve problems unaided; and the belief that connectivity is 
always an unalloyed good. Vested interests will not only obstruct necessary reforms, but often be 
so successful in doing so that it will take quite a nasty shock to make really serious action on 
many problems politically realistic. He is not afraid to mention possibilities like a decentralized 
and/or steady-state economy, international regulatory agencies to control carbon emissions or 
even world government. 
However, there is no convenient checklist of solutions at the end. Rather the book offers a path to 
a solution, beginning with the search for a middle ground between the brittleness he sees now 
and catastrophic, deep collapse. Some kind of breakdown may be unavoidable, but everything 
that can be done to blunt it, should be. 
One way is by reducing the force of the stresses he discusses. There is no "silver bullet" for them, 
but there are already numerous thinkers working on these problems, and there are clear ways to 
mitigate them (such as supporting family planning in the developing world). What is needed is for 
the experts to come together across disciplinary barriers, just as governments must come 
together from across their political ones, and act proactively on all of these fronts at once. 
At the same time systems currently oriented toward connectivity, efficiency and productivity will 
have to be made more resilient, even if it means less connectivity, efficiency and productivity. For 
instance, decentralized solar power production would be well worth pursuing, even if it is less 
efficient than the output from big fossil fuel and nuclear plants, because it would reduce the 
vulnerability to distant disruptions. If (or more likely, when) the breakdown comes, not only will 
this help minimize the damage, but it will hopefully allow room for a reorganization of modern 
systems along sounder lines. 
Of course, a happy outcome is not guaranteed. Extremists could easily take advantage of the 
disruption and worsen matters. Effective, positive action will depend on two factors. The first is 
the widespread cultivation of a mind-set that the book terms "prospective," able to cope with 
uncertainty and complexity, and neither naively optimistic nor apathetically pessimistic. The 
second is advance planning, the development of some vision of where to go afterward. This will 
mean active, meaningful debate; the development of a sense of global solidarity; and widespread 
experimentation with alternative arrangements. 
The book therefore succeeds on this level too, though one point might have been better 
developed, specifically the examination of catagenesis. Homer-Dixon's discussion of Rome's fall 
is lucid and thorough, but the story ends with that empire's deep collapse. There is no 
comparable discussion of catagenesis at a civilizational level—and indeed, there are better and 
nearer cases. Several scholars, including Carroll Quigley in The Evolution of Civilizations and 
David Hackett Fischer in The Great Wave, have discerned a pattern of previous breakdowns and 
renewals in Western history, driven by many of the same stresses (population growth, economic 
instability, abrupt climate change, etc.). The most dramatic was arguably the collapse of Medieval 
civilization amid famine, plague and war in the fourteenth century, and the rise of modernity out of 
the ruins. Particularly given Homer-Dixon's assertion that the anticipated breakdown will likely 
happen much more quickly than Rome's protracted decline, this crisis (or another like it) may 
have been usefully explored. 
This is a minor weakness, however. On the whole The Upside of Down is a valuable contribution 
to the literature for its sobering assessment of the difficulties of many of today's problems, the still 
underexamined connections between the environment and security studies, and the applicability 
of complexity science to these issues. Knee-jerk reactions to some of its arguments will turn off 
some readers, but they would be well-advised to press ahead despite that. The Upside of Down 
deserves as wide an audience as it can get, and it will hopefully provoke a more substantial 
debate on the issues it raises than has been seen so far. 
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